Man As Embodied Subjectivity

Before unpacking the implications of "embodied subjectivity," let us unlock first the meaning of each word.  The word, subject, is synonymous with the I.  I is a first-person pronoun used as a substitute for a noun in the nominative case (or, as a subject of a sentence).  Like, for example, "I am handsome," "I am a student," "I am intelligent," and so on and on.  As a subject of a sentence, the term, I, is the source of actions and predications.  The term, "embodied," serves as a modifier of the subjectivity.  Thus, embodied subjectivity means that this subject or "I" is given the human form or enfleshed in the human body.  As embodied subjectivity, man's existence is structured by this bodily or physical existence. 

Now, let's unpack some implications of man as "embodied subjectivity."  Dy (2001) suggests that embodied subjectivity is, first and foremost, a "well-spring of meanings and initiatives."  As mentioned above, all actions such as running, talking, sitting, etc. are initiated by the subject; all predicates like handsome, tall, fair complexion, etc. are ascribed to the subject.  Thus, the "I" stands as the subject having all the potentials of what he wants to be.  Traditionally, man is defined as a "rational animal," or a "thinking thing."  The problem with this definition is that man is essentially a thinking or rational being.  With this definition, man is deemed to think, think, think, think...  But, this is not always what a person or any of us does.  As a subject, man thinks, feels, gets angry, gets in love, is running, is talking, is smiling... and so and so forth.  So, thinking is only one of his mental activities.  In essence, man is a subject, which is a never-ending source of actions and predications --thus, also a source of meaning and initiatives.  It should be clear, however, that this never-ending wellspring (subjectivity) is structured by its physical conditions.  By itself, it's structureless, though.  Structureless --in the sense that nothing can control what man wants to do, what he wants to be.  But, because he is an embodied subject, all his activities like thinking, feeling, imagining, and actions like talking, running, smiling are conditioned (or structured) by his physical conditions.  In this context, it is also safe to conclude that all of his actions and activities (or external) are an embodiment of what is within (the internal).

Secondly, man as embodied subjectivity is part of his immediate environment --be it, social or natural environment.  Natural environment refers to his surroundings, the earth as a whole.  Social environment refers to the people surrounding him --his immediate family members, the community he is living in, the church he belongs, the economic and political institutions he belongs to.  All of this consists of man's being-in-the-world, his being-with-others, and his being in relation to the Absolute.  These topics will be treated in the proceeding chapters.

Phenomenological View of the Self

As shown above, the classical view is dualistic --a composition of body and soul.  Dy (2001) opines that dualism begets a two-lives theory.  On the one hand, there is a bodily or worldly life.  There is an other-worldly (spiritual) life, on the other.  Most often, one side of life is made emphasis over the other.  Plato, for instance, has given emphasis on the other-worldly life in the World of Ideas and viewed this material world as a dark world of ignorance.  Aristotle has given importance to the rationality of man, which led him to believe that there is no other purpose for man to exist except being rational.  Man is a rational animal, Aristotle said.  Being rational is the sweetest term we ascribe to man but man is still an animal.  Ang tao ang pinakamagandang hayop sa lupa peru hayop pa rin (Dy, 2001).  We can conclude that this classical definition of man is inadequate.  Let's venture another definition --a phenomenological one.

At this juncture, we will present Marcel's treatment of the question, Who am I? using primary and secondary reflection.  In his article, Primary and Secondary Reflection: The Existential Fulcrum, Marcel emphasizes that reflection is very rooted in lived experiences.  It is a way of transcending from one stage of life to another --a higher stage of life. As said earlier, Marcel did not elaborate the definition of primary and secondary reflection.  Primary reflection "dissolves the unity of experience" whereas secondary reflection "recuperates the unity of experience."  Calasanz (cited in Dy, 2001) notes that primary reflection is most likely similar to scientific investigation in that the object of reflection is "thrown in front" of the knower to be investigated.  This is necessary for scientific investigation because science aims at the objective knowledge.  Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is philosophical in that it dissipates the distinction between the object of reflection and subject who reflects.  In other words, the object becomes the subject (noema); the subject becomes the object (noesis).

Who am I?

Using primary reflection, Marcel notes that we can answer the question by providing information about ourselves like answering a bio-data.  In filling-up a bio-data, we provide our names, addresses, sex, and so on.  And, these bits of information should be true and correct.  Otherwise, if the information is not true nor correct, we will be liable in court.  However, upon taking another look (secondary reflection) on this true and correct information, one could have some silly or awkward feeling.  For example, Pedro is a gay.  If he fills in the item on SEX, then, of course, he has to choose MALE, not FEMALE.  Because he is a gay, the word MALE somehow sounds silly or awkward to him.  But, even how he feels awkward about it, he has to choose MALE.  Otherwise, he can be liable in court.  On this ground, Marcel notes that in using secondary reflection, there is another sense of talking who I am.  Besides those bits of information about myself, I am another "somebody."  And, this "somebody" is the "I" or the "subject."  Hence, Marcel treats the next question, Do I exist?

Do I exist?

Does my subject (or the I) exist?  Marcel notes that Descartes' meditation of his existence is derived from his own thinking.  Let us remember that Rene Descartes starts his meditation by doubting everything that there is to doubt.  In systematically doubting everything, he is able to come to a conclusion that there is one thing which becomes indubitable (that cannot be doubted) --that is, doubting itself.  In a word, he can no longer put to doubt his own doubting because if he doubts his own doubting, he proves that he exists.  Cogito ergo sum (I think [doubt] therefore I exist), Descartes concludes.  For Descartes, the "I" or the "subject" exists primarily as a thinking thing.  In deeper analysis, this Cartesian cogito can exist by itself --in solitary existence.  For Marcel, this Cartesian meditation of existence (sum) is merely possible in the level of primary reflection.  Upon taking another look (secondary reflection), I realize I exist not because I think but I exist in relation to others.  In other words, my existence is not made in isolation but I know I exist because there is somebody else who exists.  Why it is so?  That is because of my body.

My Body

How do  I regard my body?  In the primary level of reflection, one can say, "I have my body."  To say I have my body is just like saying I have or own my watch.  But, there is a spatial difference between owning a body and owning a watch because my body goes wherever I go but my watch won't.  However, upon taking another look (secondary reflection), one shall say, "I am my body."  My body is inseparably one with the "I" or the subject.  My body is "me."  For clarity, let's take the case of a prostitute.  In the primary level, the prostitute can say, "I can sell my body because this is mine."  Since this body is mine, I have the right and responsibility for it.  Nobody can dictate what I want to do with what I own.  On this basis, she's correct.  But, upon taking another look (secondary reflection), what she is selling is not simply what she owns but she "herself."  In selling her body, she sells herself because "she is her body."  And, selling herself is selling her dignity.  In this illustration, it's clear that "my body is me."  In the words of Marcel, "I am my body."  But, Marcel is also aware that we cannot totally reduce the "I" or "subject" to crass materialism.  The "I" remains a fount of meaning and initiatives --thus, a subject.

From a phenomenological perspective, man is no longer viewed as a composite of body and soul (dualistic) but viewed holistically.  Man is an "embodied subject."