One may detest philosophy because
it talks of nothing in particular.
Although great philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas,
Rene Descartes, among others have built grandiose systems of thought but these
systems of thought create more disagreements than having agreements among those
of great minds. Although there are
different subjects in philosophy specifically dealing with a particular topic such as being, society, knowledge, etc. yet these subjects don’t refer to
something particular. For example, in
Metaphysics philosophers are dealing with the concept of “being.” By its comprehension and extension, “being”
refers to anything that exists but nothing in particular. Thus, a metaphysician has all things
–literally all things seen and unseen, to investigate but he holds nothing in
particular in his hand to investigate with.
In other words, philosophers have “all” to talk about but they offer us
nothing in particular. Some philosophers
who detest this sort of philosophical enterprise charge other philosophers of
mumbling words which are empty of meanings, or words which contain no reference
to anything and anyhow in the external world.
In this regard, I’d like to share
my readings on this matter, particularly on the idea that great philosophers are
talking “non-sense.” Jacques Derrida, a
French philosopher, is one of those who claim that “there is nothing outside
the text.” If one is going to read all Platonic
dialogues where a great philosopher, Plato, laid out his system of philosophy
commonly known as Platonism, and if he follows Derrida, he will have a second
thought if Plato is telling the truth or not.
If he has this doubt in mind, he will come to believe that Platonism is
just a piece of literary work and a product of imagination of a morbid
Plato. If it’s a piece of literary work
and a product of a wild imagination, then those who are studying them in the
name of scholarly underpinning cannot exactly be called “experts or scholars”
of Plato but “avid fans” of Plato. It’s
all non-sense. Reading Plato’s
dialogues, commenting on them, or studying on them is all “non-sense,” since in
the first place, Platonism is non-sense.
In other words, what Plato wrote in all of his dialogues, which some historians
of philosophy considered as great philosophical thought, is a “trash” since it
doesn’t have anything outside of it (the text) to refer to. Maybe, philosophers after Derrida may come
think of “recycling” Platonic trash or any trash of philosophical system built
by scavenger (philosopher) driven by philosophical urge. It’s better for them to have a conviction
that there is money in trash –so, Platonic trash is now convertible to cash,
and it’s good for the environment of philosophers who deemed “clean” or who
disliked to see philosophical “trashes” in their book shelves.
I have nothing against Derrida’s
critic on the tradition of the Western philosophy. In fact, I appreciate his ways of showing the
disparity between language and reality.
This method is known as deconstructionism. I don’t want also to appear like one of those
who want to keep the philosophical tradition in the West unblemished by stains
from the dirty hands of playful philosophers like Derrida or Rorty. Derrida’s brand of philosophical enterprise
is not something new. It echoes the
noise created by nominalist philosophers during the Medieval ages and is
repeated by Richard Rorty (an American pragmatist) in contemporary times.
Nominalism holds that any word
bears nothing but names. In ancient
times, Greek philosophers like Aristotle showed that a word corresponds to
something external or that exists in reality.
For example, if you say “table,” this word “table” exists in reality or
corresponds to something external other than the word itself. It’s not actually a problem if a word only
refers “ostensively” to an external thing.
It becomes a problem if a philosopher like Plato talks of something which
doesn’t have any corresponding reality.
When, for example, Plato theorized the “formal ideas” found in the World
of Ideas, which are considered real or true, this creates a very big problem
because we have nothing in external world what Plato called “formal
ideas.” “Formal idea” doesn’t have any
ostensive meaning, a meaning that can be unlocked by simply pointing it by your
finger. For example, when you say
“table,” by ostensive definition, you do it by pointing your finger to a thing
we generally call table. But when you
say “formal idea,” you cannot use your finger to point it out since there is
none of its kind in the external word.
Nominalists are not having fun of
that kind of idea, especially that idea of looking for an ostensive definition
of a philosophical term. There is none
of it in reality. You find it hopeless
to scavenge of it in the world of experience.
A word bears only the sound. It
doesn’t bear any external reality. For
nominalists, it’s better to remain contented of hearing the mere sound of a
word rather than believing that a word has anything outside of it. This is basically the claim of Derrida. However, the problem is when
deconstructionists believe that every word bears nothing external except its
mere sound. They haven’t tried to
distinguish object-language and meta-language.
The word “table” is an object-language.
You can define it ostensively.
The “formal idea” of Plato is a meta-language. You can never have an ostensive definition of
it. The problem of deconstructionism and
nominalism lies in the fact that it surreptitiously applies to every single
word the belief that words create only sound rather than meaning.
