This article is still in connection with my last article posted online dated January 27, 2017. My conclusion in that article is that no one can monopolize knowledge. This conclusion implies an epistemological question, "What is, then, a real knowledge?" This is what I like to explore in this article, if nobody can take all what it takes in inquiry, then who'll declare that one has everything to take. To put it simply, if nobody has the authority to say whether one is correct or not, then what is the criterion of knowledge? To further our question, we ask, is real knowledge tenable?
It's perhaps liberating to know that nobody can monopolize knowledge. No one will tell another researcher that he's wrong, or criticize his methodology in research, or criticize his findings, and more. One is free to do what he wants in research. He's free of worries regarding his topic to research. He's free of worries regarding what technicalities to follow in research. He's free of worries of his writing skills. He's free of worries whether he's correct or not of his findings. It's just like saying, "no one commits mistake; so everybody's right." Yet, we can't go on with things like this. It's as good as relativism. Knowledge is relative to each and every inquirer/ researcher. Knowledge is as good as anyone else, which at the same time, is as worse as anything else. In consequence, it's not knowledge but merely a capricious belief, which is not worth having nor defending for.
This dilemma creates a paradoxical kind of reality. It's liberating yet disturbing -liberating, in the sense that a researcher doesn't care of the right research methods and the right language, and disturbing, in the sense that a researcher writes nothing but merely a piece of literary work and nothing outside of it.
This set of questions is not actually novel. This has been asked and answered by different philosophers in the past like Plato, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, among others. Yet, we find no common answers among them. In fact, their answers are conflicting and opposing.
In conclusion, the theory of falsifiability poses some troublesome issues regarding what we know with certainty. Its main concern is that knowledge is untenable even if it is scientific.
It's perhaps liberating to know that nobody can monopolize knowledge. No one will tell another researcher that he's wrong, or criticize his methodology in research, or criticize his findings, and more. One is free to do what he wants in research. He's free of worries regarding his topic to research. He's free of worries regarding what technicalities to follow in research. He's free of worries of his writing skills. He's free of worries whether he's correct or not of his findings. It's just like saying, "no one commits mistake; so everybody's right." Yet, we can't go on with things like this. It's as good as relativism. Knowledge is relative to each and every inquirer/ researcher. Knowledge is as good as anyone else, which at the same time, is as worse as anything else. In consequence, it's not knowledge but merely a capricious belief, which is not worth having nor defending for.
This dilemma creates a paradoxical kind of reality. It's liberating yet disturbing -liberating, in the sense that a researcher doesn't care of the right research methods and the right language, and disturbing, in the sense that a researcher writes nothing but merely a piece of literary work and nothing outside of it.
This set of questions is not actually novel. This has been asked and answered by different philosophers in the past like Plato, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, among others. Yet, we find no common answers among them. In fact, their answers are conflicting and opposing.
In conclusion, the theory of falsifiability poses some troublesome issues regarding what we know with certainty. Its main concern is that knowledge is untenable even if it is scientific.
