Saving Philosophy!

Contemporary philosophers with post-modernist orientation reject outright the legacy of the philosophical tradition in the West.  Post-modernism is usually identified with philosophers in 19th century onwards and often characterized with non-dualistic perspective.  Friedrich Nietzsche is known as the prophet of post-modernism with his nihilist claim, “God is dead.”  (Nihilism –from the Latin word meaning “nothing.”)  In Christian tradition, God is said to be the “alpha and omega” (beginning and end), and foundation of everything that exists.  God is also the source of man’s knowledge and morals.  But with Nietzsche’s pronouncement that God is dead, man is left with nothing –no foundation of his being and the criterion of his knowledge and morals.  To overcome the death of God, he should become an “ubermensch” (superman) and shall be able to “fly without wings,” like the one we see in the series of Superman movies.  This Nietzschean philosophy is entirely “nihilist” –in the sense that it is non-foundationalist.  It rejects altogether the idea of all foundations of existence, knowledge, meaning of life, morals, among others.

Philosophy has been one of the celebrated sciences –if we mean by science in its literal sense, that is, a body of knowledge.  In the tradition of the ancient Greeks, philosophy –identified then with metaphysics, became the highest of all sciences (again, in its literal sense) and shall perch in the pedestal because philosophizing is a god-like activity.  Gods and goddesses dwell in Mount Olympus –the holy mountain in ancient Greek civilization.  Thus, they are apart from the habitation of the mortals.  While the mortals struggle against the vicissitudes of life, they stand on top of the mountain as spectators watching and intervening at times the affairs of the mortals.  To stand on top of the mountain like a god is a privilege.  It is on top of the mountain where one can see everything below as one unified whole.  It is on top where one can tell stories about the affairs of the mortals.  A mortal obsessed in a day-to-day concern has no place and time to stop, look, write and tell his own stories, his fellow mortal’s stories as well.  To scribble stories can only be done when a mortal is not directly engaged in the daily affairs of all other mortals.  That is exactly what is meant by philosophy as a “god-like activity.”  A philosopher is privileged to perch on top of the mountain like a god and sees everything below as a “unified whole,” and articulates his vision of the whole as a “theoria.”  Philosophizing, then, is simply having a “perspective” higher than the ordinary.  Since philosophizing is taking a higher perspective, it implies that a philosopher is (1) willing to break his ties from obsession of the day-to-day concerns, (2) willing to take the higher perspective, (3) willing to have the vision of the whole, (4) willing to articulate his vision of the whole, and (5) willing to defend his articulation of the vision of the whole.

Plato, however, made philosophy a search for something metaphysical to ground all realities.  Distrusting the physical world as a fleeting reality, he speculated of a world, which is the real, the unchanging and the eternal –the “World of Forms.”  At the outset, Plato divided two kinds of world: the world of senses and the world of forms.  The world of senses does not provide us the true knowledge but only opinion, since all perceptual experience of it is fleeting, keeps on changing –thus, perception is deceptive.  The world of forms, on the other hand, is the source of real knowledge since it is immutable and can only be accessed through reason.  Contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty accuse Plato of introducing dualistic sort of philosophizing in the West.  And, all philosophies after Plato are caught up under the thrall of Plato.  Rorty also charged Platonism as foundationalist, aside from being dualistic.  One assumption of Platonism is that true knowledge must consist of a correspondence between language and reality, or the spoken word and the outside world.  For example, when I say, I know that the sun is hot is certainly true if and only if the sun is hot.  What I claim I know with certainty like “the sun is hot” is true if and only if it corresponds to the outside world. 

Richard Rorty rejects this sort of philosophy which is dualistic and foundationalist.  This sort of philosophy does not help for the improvement of humanity.  The betterment of human conditions does not rely on the search of what is true but on social hope.  Thus, there is a need to redirect one’s philosophical search for the “ideal form,” which will make the future of humanity better, instead of scrambling for something which doesn’t exist at all like the Platonic ideal forms.  It's futile to look for the ideal forms to ground for knowledge since in the first place there is no such thing as the World of Forms.  It is rather helpful to divert one's energy and attention to search for something that makes future humanity a better one.  Rorty wants to replace knowledge with social hope.  Rortian critic against Platonism is really and disturbing.  He dethrones philosophy from its place as the highest of all sciences.  Philosophy, therefore, shall be treated like one of the other disciplines.   And, he thinks he's right when he gives up teaching philosophy -a position where he becomes renowned worldwide, and holds position in teaching literature instead.

With this attack against philosophy, is there any way to save philosophy? 

In deeper analysis, what Rorty is ferociously attacking is not the whole philosophical tradition in the West.  He is particularly against Platonism.  Saving philosophy is possible if philosophy is still understood as a "god-like activity," not a metaphysical one like that of Plato.

Husserl’s Phenomenological Methods

In this article, I'd like to clarify some issues regarding phenomenological methods misunderstood or misinterpreted by practitioners of qualitative research studies.  When one uses phenomenological methods, it is understood that he’s designing his research in qualitative way of gathering data to support his purported conclusions.  

For Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a German philosopher, credited as the Father of Phenomenology, phenomenology is not a school of thought such as idealism, realism, scepticism, relativism, Platonism, etc.  It is rather a movement against naturalistic psychology during his times.  What Husserl disliked in psychologism is that in conducting studies there are certain basic assumptions which it hasn’t put into question and has compromised the validity of its methods in doing research.  For example, psychologism believes (assumes) that human behavior is conditioned by external factors like its environment and history rather than caused by the free will of the agent.  This assumption is somehow influenced by naturalism, which claims that true factual knowledge is lurking or hidden in nature; one has to have the right discipline and methods to acquire it.  For a behaviorist, human behavior is just like any event in the physical world.  If a man gets angry, his behavior is like an event of an apple falling from its branch.  This event of a falling apple is caused by a force external to it (the gravitational force), so as man’s anger –caused by factors external of him rather than his inner states.  Thus, man’s behavior is predictable or controllable depending however on the systems of rewards and punishments given or imposed to the actor.  

Husserl’s intention in reacting against this scientific attitude in doing research studies is for a researcher to “stop, look and listen.”  There is a need for a researcher to recollect or reflect his ways or methods of doing research.  This is the reason why phenomenology is primarily a science of consciousness rather than of facts or physical world.  For one to see the world or phenomenon “with new eyes,” he has to bracket his natural attitude –all presuppositions he carries in conducting studies.  This step is what Husserl terms as “epoche.”  In using epoche, Husserl wants to make philosophy a “presupposition-less science,” –a philosophy with less number of presuppositions.

At first, it seems that Husserl’s attack against psychologism is merely concerned with its methods in doing studies.  Something is wrong in the way a behaviorist conducts his studies.  As mentioned above, psychologism assumes that human behavior is conditioned.  Every behavior of a single person is not caused by his own free will, which leads us to conclude that man has no freedom at all.  Hence, it is difficult to assert that a person has subjectivity, which is the source and fountain of meaning and initiatives of his being and becoming.  On this basis, it follows that to study the nature of man, a researcher should design his study in quantitative way.  Man’s behavior is caused by external factors, directly or indirectly affecting his behavior.  Since these factors are external, observable and quantifiable, a researcher has to rely on data quantitatively designed to support his purported conclusions.  In-depth interview or field note does nothing to gain knowledge of man's nature since, in the first place, man has no subjectivity –no inner fountain of meaning and initiatives.  How could the inner self of man be a source of knowledge if he doesn’t have such freedom and subjectivity?  But for psychologism, man’s freedom and subjectivity (taken as one) does not define his being, but the external factors influencing his behaviors do.

For Husserl, the method of psychologism is erroneous and unreliable.  At the outset, it compromises the validity of the results of its study.  Because of this, Husserl sees the importance of a researcher to “bracket” his presuppositions, biases, or what he calls the “natural attitude.”  This is not to get rid of all of these presuppositions since all scientists work within a certain framework tainted with biases and presuppositions.  The point of Husserl, however, is to hold in abeyance (temporarily) all these presuppositions so that a researcher can see the field of his investigation with “new eyes.”  To do this needs much discipline and a shift of paradigm.  Thus, phenomenology begins by examining all those presuppositions in conducting research studies.  “Back to the things in themselves,” Husserl claims.  A researcher shall make the phenomenon of his experiences pure, or shall I say “appear as it appears” untainted by his biases or presuppositions.  He can only let the “phenomenon” be, unless he brackets his biases or presuppositions. 

If a researcher can clear up all his biases or presuppositions in conducting studies, then he is now able to get the “eidos” (essence) of his experience.  Husserl believes that in one’s whole field of experience, there is something invariant, which serves as the essential of his experience.  Amidst the fleeting nature of experiences, eidos (essence) lurks behind.  This eidos is something important that one cannot neglect or it’s worth having for.  For example, in one’s whole field of experiences being a parent, he/she can figure out something invariant, which is also the essential.  This essence somehow depends on one’s experience –thus, more or less, subjective.  After finding the “eidos” of experience, one can reduce it to the very activity of himself.  He/she can own it and translate it into his very action or behavior.  In other words, the whole of phenomenology is not simply “reflecting one’s conduct of research,” or simply finding the essence of the whole of experience but also making one’s life meaningful with the essence he finds in his study. 

In conclusion, one thing misunderstood in the practice of phenomenology is that it is simply a method appropriate for qualitative research design.  However, Husserl's main intention to start the movement of phenomenology is to set aside presuppositions or biases in conducting studies, which among practitioners of phenomenology nowadays are no longer aware of.