For Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a German philosopher,
credited as the Father of Phenomenology, phenomenology is not a school of thought
such as idealism, realism, scepticism, relativism, Platonism, etc. It is rather a movement against naturalistic psychology during his times. What Husserl disliked
in psychologism is that in conducting studies there are certain basic
assumptions which it hasn’t put into question and has compromised the validity
of its methods in doing research. For
example, psychologism believes (assumes) that human behavior is conditioned by
external factors like its environment and history rather than caused by the free
will of the agent. This assumption is
somehow influenced by naturalism, which claims that true factual knowledge is
lurking or hidden in nature; one has to have the right discipline and methods
to acquire it. For a behaviorist, human
behavior is just like any event in the physical world. If a man gets angry, his behavior is like an
event of an apple falling from its branch.
This event of a falling apple is caused by a force external to it (the
gravitational force), so as man’s anger –caused by factors external of him
rather than his inner states. Thus,
man’s behavior is predictable or controllable depending however on the systems
of rewards and punishments given or imposed to the actor.
Husserl’s intention in reacting against this scientific attitude
in doing research studies is for a researcher to “stop, look and listen.” There is a need for a researcher to recollect
or reflect his ways or methods of doing research. This is the reason why phenomenology is
primarily a science of consciousness rather than of facts or physical
world. For one to see the world or
phenomenon “with new eyes,” he has to bracket his natural attitude –all
presuppositions he carries in conducting studies. This step is what Husserl terms as
“epoche.” In using epoche, Husserl wants to make philosophy a “presupposition-less
science,” –a philosophy with less number of presuppositions.
At first, it seems that Husserl’s attack against psychologism
is merely concerned with its methods in doing studies. Something is wrong in the way a behaviorist
conducts his studies. As mentioned
above, psychologism assumes that human behavior is conditioned. Every behavior of a single person is not
caused by his own free will, which leads us to conclude that man has no freedom
at all. Hence, it is difficult to assert
that a person has subjectivity, which is the source and fountain of meaning and
initiatives of his being and becoming. On
this basis, it follows that to study the nature of man, a researcher should
design his study in quantitative way. Man’s
behavior is caused by external factors, directly or indirectly affecting his
behavior. Since these factors are
external, observable and quantifiable,
a researcher has to rely on data quantitatively designed to support his
purported conclusions. In-depth
interview or field note does nothing to gain knowledge of man's nature
since, in the first place, man has no subjectivity –no inner fountain of
meaning and initiatives. How could the
inner self of man be a source of knowledge if he doesn’t have such freedom and
subjectivity? But for psychologism,
man’s freedom and subjectivity (taken as one) does not define his being, but
the external factors influencing his behaviors do.
For Husserl, the method of psychologism is erroneous and
unreliable. At the outset, it
compromises the validity of the results of its study. Because of this, Husserl sees the importance
of a researcher to “bracket” his presuppositions, biases, or what he calls the
“natural attitude.” This is not to get
rid of all of these presuppositions since all scientists work within a certain
framework tainted with biases and presuppositions. The point of Husserl, however, is to hold in
abeyance (temporarily) all these presuppositions so that a researcher can see
the field of his investigation with “new eyes.”
To do this needs much discipline and a shift of paradigm. Thus, phenomenology begins by
examining all those presuppositions in conducting research studies. “Back to the things in themselves,” Husserl
claims. A researcher shall make the
phenomenon of his experiences pure, or shall I say “appear as it appears”
untainted by his biases or presuppositions.
He can only let the “phenomenon” be, unless he brackets his biases or
presuppositions.
If a researcher can clear up all his biases or
presuppositions in conducting studies, then he is now able to get the “eidos”
(essence) of his experience. Husserl
believes that in one’s whole field of experience, there is something invariant,
which serves as the essential of his experience. Amidst the fleeting nature of experiences,
eidos (essence) lurks behind. This eidos
is something important that one cannot neglect or it’s worth having for. For example, in one’s whole field of
experiences being a parent, he/she can figure out something invariant, which is
also the essential. This essence somehow
depends on one’s experience –thus, more or less, subjective. After finding the “eidos” of experience, one
can reduce it to the very activity of himself.
He/she can own it and translate it into his very action or behavior. In other words, the whole of phenomenology is
not simply “reflecting one’s conduct of research,” or simply finding the
essence of the whole of experience but also making one’s life meaningful with the
essence he finds in his study.
In conclusion, one thing misunderstood in the
practice of phenomenology is that it is simply a method appropriate for
qualitative research design. However,
Husserl's main intention to start the movement of phenomenology is to set aside presuppositions or biases in conducting studies,
which among practitioners of phenomenology nowadays are no longer aware of.
