Testimonies or Stories?

There is an interesting development at the House probe on the illegal drug trade in the New Bilibid Prison.  This development has something to do with the philosophical problem of arriving at truth which I am going to discuss a bit later.

 

Some personalities involved in this drug trade were summoned to testify[1] on the alleged illegal activities happening inside NBP.  Drug lords, police officers, NBP officers, and security aides of former DOJ secretary including Ronnie Dayan, who claimed he was a driver-security, a lover as well of then DOJ secretary Leila de Lima appeared in the Committee hearing and read prepared testimonies with an assistance of a legal counsel.  This Committee hearing in the Lower House appeared like a real scenario in the proper court, only that in the hearing there was no accused presented, no eyewitnesses shown (members of the Committee called them “resource persons” instead), and no judges.  That was not, however, judicial in nature but intended to aid Representatives in their legislation.

What transpired in the series of hearings is that all testimonies of “resource persons” summoned by the Committee to testify implicated Sen. Leila de Lima allegedly asking from drug lords some payolas for her senatorial campaign in exchange of protection in their drug trade.  However, during the last hearing, a certain member of the Committee noted and remarked addressing to Dayan, “paiba-iba ang kwento ninyo” (you’re making different versions of the story.)   He might not be referring only to the testimony of Dayan but other testimonies of some resource persons as well.  This remark tickles my imagination and leads me to write this article since this is not only a problem in hearing cases but a very philosophical one. 

The nature of reading sworn affidavits like one read by Dayan is to find out what is really the truth.  I like how it is said in Tagalog, “kung ano talaga ang katutuhanan.”  Truth has been a subject matter of lively debate by different philosophers in the history of philosophy.  Many philosophers claim that truth doesn’t change; it’s immutable.  In the words of Aristotle, “a proposition is true if, of what is the case, it says that it is the case, or if, of what it is not the case, it says that it is not the case.”  In a testimony, a witness should meet the following truth-conditions: (1) what he is going to testify is what is really the case or is happening, (2) nothing is left unsaid or unspoken, (3) nothing is intentionally omitted, and (4) nothing is a lie.  If all testimonies given by all persons involved in the issue meet all of these truth-conditions, then it would follow that each of them is telling the truth and their testimonies shall cohere (magkatugma ang sinabi nila).  In the hearing, convicted drug lords and some NBP personnel involved pointed their fingers to Dayan as the bagman of then Secretary de Lima.  Dayan, however, denied their allegations and denied having acquaintance with them. 

That’s where the problem lies.  One of them must be telling a lie.  Thus, one or more sworn affidavits by those resource persons are “stories,” not testimonies.  “Stories” are pre-fabricated, intentionally made to meet the end of the author/s.  If they’re not testimonies but stories, then this House probe fools the public into believing that De Lima is the culprit.  If that’s what the Committee is up to, then it defeats the purpose of having that hearing, which is to know the issue of illegal drug trade in NBP.

The current DOJ Secretary Aguirre knows that all of these testimonies presented at the House probe don’t hold water in the proper court to implicate De Lima as the mastermind of all these illegal activities.  Testimonial evidence is insufficient; it gives “probable cause” to implicate De Lima though.  But, by principle, a judge can’t convict a suspect on the basis of insufficient evidence.  A judge convicts a suspect unless pieces of evidence give “no room for doubt.”  Until now, there is no case filed against De Lima by the DOJ.  Senator De Lima knows it very well.  Despite all issues hurled against her, she remains in composure.  She can’t be convicted based on all those testimonies.  Well, in the first place, DOJ can’t find a case against her.  "Sextortion," illegal possession of husband, guess what?

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[1] I think “testify” is not the correct term because in the first place they were not considered eyewitnesses but “resource persons.”

Philosophy as "Trash"

One may detest philosophy because it talks of nothing in particular.  Although great philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, among others have built grandiose systems of thought but these systems of thought create more disagreements than having agreements among those of great minds.  Although there are different subjects in philosophy specifically dealing with a particular topic such as being, society, knowledge, etc. yet these subjects don’t refer to something particular.  For example, in Metaphysics philosophers are dealing with the concept of “being.”  By its comprehension and extension, “being” refers to anything that exists but nothing in particular.  Thus, a metaphysician has all things –literally all things seen and unseen, to investigate but he holds nothing in particular in his hand to investigate with.  In other words, philosophers have “all” to talk about but they offer us nothing in particular.  Some philosophers who detest this sort of philosophical enterprise charge other philosophers of mumbling words which are empty of meanings, or words which contain no reference to anything and anyhow in the external world. 

In this regard, I’d like to share my readings on this matter, particularly on the idea that great philosophers are talking “non-sense.”  Jacques Derrida, a French philosopher, is one of those who claim that “there is nothing outside the text.”  If one is going to read all Platonic dialogues where a great philosopher, Plato, laid out his system of philosophy commonly known as Platonism, and if he follows Derrida, he will have a second thought if Plato is telling the truth or not.  If he has this doubt in mind, he will come to believe that Platonism is just a piece of literary work and a product of imagination of a morbid Plato.  If it’s a piece of literary work and a product of a wild imagination, then those who are studying them in the name of scholarly underpinning cannot exactly be called “experts or scholars” of Plato but “avid fans” of Plato.  It’s all non-sense.  Reading Plato’s dialogues, commenting on them, or studying on them is all “non-sense,” since in the first place, Platonism is non-sense.  In other words, what Plato wrote in all of his dialogues, which some historians of philosophy considered as great philosophical thought, is a “trash” since it doesn’t have anything outside of it (the text) to refer to.  Maybe, philosophers after Derrida may come think of “recycling” Platonic trash or any trash of philosophical system built by scavenger (philosopher) driven by philosophical urge.  It’s better for them to have a conviction that there is money in trash –so, Platonic trash is now convertible to cash, and it’s good for the environment of philosophers who deemed “clean” or who disliked to see philosophical “trashes” in their book shelves. 

I have nothing against Derrida’s critic on the tradition of the Western philosophy.  In fact, I appreciate his ways of showing the disparity between language and reality.  This method is known as deconstructionism.  I don’t want also to appear like one of those who want to keep the philosophical tradition in the West unblemished by stains from the dirty hands of playful philosophers like Derrida or Rorty.  Derrida’s brand of philosophical enterprise is not something new.  It echoes the noise created by nominalist philosophers during the Medieval ages and is repeated by Richard Rorty (an American pragmatist) in contemporary times. 

Nominalism holds that any word bears nothing but names.  In ancient times, Greek philosophers like Aristotle showed that a word corresponds to something external or that exists in reality.  For example, if you say “table,” this word “table” exists in reality or corresponds to something external other than the word itself.  It’s not actually a problem if a word only refers “ostensively” to an external thing.  It becomes a problem if a philosopher like Plato talks of something which doesn’t have any corresponding reality.  When, for example, Plato theorized the “formal ideas” found in the World of Ideas, which are considered real or true, this creates a very big problem because we have nothing in external world what Plato called “formal ideas.”  “Formal idea” doesn’t have any ostensive meaning, a meaning that can be unlocked by simply pointing it by your finger.  For example, when you say “table,” by ostensive definition, you do it by pointing your finger to a thing we generally call table.  But when you say “formal idea,” you cannot use your finger to point it out since there is none of its kind in the external word.

Nominalists are not having fun of that kind of idea, especially that idea of looking for an ostensive definition of a philosophical term.  There is none of it in reality.  You find it hopeless to scavenge of it in the world of experience.  A word bears only the sound.  It doesn’t bear any external reality.  For nominalists, it’s better to remain contented of hearing the mere sound of a word rather than believing that a word has anything outside of it.  This is basically the claim of Derrida.  However, the problem is when deconstructionists believe that every word bears nothing external except its mere sound.  They haven’t tried to distinguish object-language and meta-language.  The word “table” is an object-language.  You can define it ostensively.  The “formal idea” of Plato is a meta-language.  You can never have an ostensive definition of it.  The problem of deconstructionism and nominalism lies in the fact that it surreptitiously applies to every single word the belief that words create only sound rather than meaning.

In conclusion, philosophy is trivializing language.  Philosophers want to clear up trivialities in philosophy and its language.  But in so doing, they trivialize it more.  Anyway, that’s the business of philosophers.

Human Being and His Environment (part 2)

In my previous article, I tried to trace the historical account on how people viewed man’s nature in relation to environment.  Ancient Greeks viewed man as a “spectator” of the flux of nature.  Medieval men viewed man as a “steward” of nature, the creation of God.  With these ideas of “spectatorship” and “stewardship,” ancient Greeks and Medieval people never viewed man as a “master” of nature/ environment.  By “master” of nature, I mean he does not have to subject nature/environment to his dominion or control.

This paradigm on nature of man develops an attitude among ancient Greeks and Medieval people to take responsibility of the environment.  They never have the attitude to abuse nature/environment to advance human self-interests or the attitude to actively intervene the natural process of nature forcing it to secrete its laws. 

However this paradigm changed during the Scientific Revolution roughly about 1550-1700.  Scientific Revolution is marked by shifts in perspective specifically in how people view the world.  For example, Copernicus introduced the idea that the sun is the center of the universe[1], which contradicted the long-held belief of the medieval scientists and church authorities that the earth is the center of the universe.  This paradigm shift is now known as the Copernican revolution –a 360-degrees shift in perspective.  To have it was really a challenge on the part of Copernicus, owing to the fact that it is a long-held belief and the church, which propounded that idea, was considered infallible in her teachings and doctrines during those times.  In doing so, Copernicus was not only introducing a new idea (or a revolutionary idea) but also construing that the infallible authority of the church as a magistrate can be questioned or can be put into doubt.

It is in this scenario that we can understand the philosophy of Rene Descartes who lived in the middle part of the period known as the Scientific Revolution.  Descartes, a French philosopher, toyed the idea that everything can be doubted –even those ideas held by the church as teachings, dogmas or doctrines.  Yet, there is only one thing that he cannot put into doubt –and that is, he is doubting.  For Descartes, everything is dubitable, except his own doubting.  If he doubts, he thinks.  If he thinks, he exists.  Thus, Descartes is famous of his dictum “I think therefore I am.”  (In Latin phrase, cogito ergo sum.)  What essentially is his philosophy is capsulized in saying that “man, by nature, is a thinking being.”  As a thinking being, he has capabilities to constitute other beings’ existence and its knowledge of them.  In the words of Francis Bacon, “with reason, we can put nature on a rack.” 

This philosophical claim that man is a “thinking being” is not something new, or not a revolutionary idea.  Descartes’ predecessors have similar affirmation, for example Plato, Aristotle, St Thomas to name just a few.  What is revolutionary in this claim is that “as thinking being, man can become the master of nature.”  In the words of Descartes, man can constitute his knowledge of the world, which is entirely different from the way Greeks think of the world.  For the Greeks, the world is naturally “constituted.”  But, since the world can be doubted, it loses its foundation to be the source of knowledge.  Thus, man has to constitute his knowledge of it.  Or, in the words of Bacon, “with reason, we can put nature on a rack,” which is again a contradiction of what ancient philosophers think of nature/environment.  For the medieval people, for example, the world is something “entrusted” to them by God, so they are stewards of it, not masters of it. 

This modern philosophy[2] revolutionizes our view of nature/environment.  In the framework of modern philosophers, experimentation is the key to know the secrets of nature.  If we “put nature on the rack” to study it, which is done in scientific experiments, we force nature to secrete its laws.  If we know nature’s laws, we can control or manipulate it.  Thus, we say, “knowledge is power.”  He who is knowledgeable is powerful –in the sense that he is able to control or manipulate nature.  For example, we know how egg cells and sperm cells work during ejaculation in sexual intercourse of two partners.  Conception starts when egg and sperm cells combine in the uterus.  If there is no meeting of the two cells, there is no conception that will happen.  With this knowledge, we are able to manipulate the behavior of egg and sperm cells, like the use of contraceptives during sexual intercourse hinders the meeting of the cells.  From active experiments, we are able to intervene and even manipulate the process or workings of nature, which we consider as natural or say, “the nature’s way.”  Thus, the difference between natural and man-made or artificial is clearly drawn.  Man’s intervention to processes of environment is considered man-made or artificial.  At the outset, we come to believe that what is man-made is easier and faster, and what is natural is slow-paced.  Today’s motto is “the faster, the better.”

In conclusion, with this modern paradigm, nature/environment is at the mercy man’s thinking power, which most of the time becomes capricious.  With our experiences of calamities brought about by global warming, we’ve now come to realize how much abuses we’ve done to Mother Earth.  And, there is an urgent need to attend to the call to care once more of our environment.  To realize this we need to have another paradigm shift.

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[1] Of course, we have to remember that their idea of universe is not the same idea that we have today.  Maybe, medieval people had only some planets, a moon, and a sun in mind when they talked of universe, and these heavenly bodies are revolving around the earth.  Today, universe is as immense as we can imagine and we think it as boundless.

[2] The philosophy of Rene Descartes is generally regarded as “modern philosophy.”  In fact, Descartes is considered as the Father of Modern Philosophy.

Positivism and Phenomenology

It seems to me that in social sciences, the two contrasting methods of research, namely: positivistic and phenomenological, are inseparably one or cannot be divorced from each other, but each works in different ways.  What I have in mind is that if one is using phenomenological methods and come up with essences of the original experience, he could validate the formulated essences using positivistic methods.  It is a cyclic process, since one could not only end up with meaning to a particular experience, but also validate that meaning using positivistic method.  In a sense, validation of meaning is simply proving that the formulated meaning is universalizable.  (I have encountered this term when reading a book of a certain author; in the book he cited (Gadamer or Habermas) who coined this term.)

In doing so, it is a fulfillment of Husserl’s phenomenological method, since in my opinion, Husserl’s phenomenological method is a vicious cycle of finding the essence of the whole field of experience. One is going to arrive at the essence of the experience by using the steps of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, as follows:

a.      Epoche – bracketing of natural attitude, and see the original experience with “new eyes;”

b.      Eidetic Reduction – reducing the original experience into its essence

But, a researcher has to be careful in arriving at the essence, since essence as Husserl perceived it, is the invariant of the experience.  In my mind, the invariant is something unchanging within the whole field of one’s experience or the whole field of common experience.

                                  

In my opinion, to arrive at something universalizable is to utilize the positivistic method.  What I have in mind when talking of positivistic method is the quantitative research method.  In so doing, we try to quantify the meaning we formulate from the original experience.  In quantifying it, we may use self-made questionnaire or a standardized questionnaire.  This is to prove that there is something universalizable from the essence.

In this regard, the idea of essence is neither in Aristotelian sense nor Husserlian sense.  Essence is no longer seen as invariant or the unchanging in the experience but simply as a structure common in the experience.  Essence is not inherent in the phenomenon of one’s experience.  Essence is something structural or simply appears as a common structure of one’s experience. 

This structural form is not also understood in Kantian sense, which is something inherent in one’s mind.  This structural form is rather dependent on conditions existing in the perceiving subject and conditions existing in the phenomenon itself.  (In this sense, I am borrowing the idea of Lonergan’s idea of insight, but I need an exhaustive study of Lonergan’s book, entitled Insight.)

The idea of universalizability coincides with Lonergan’s epistemological stance. 

Human Person and His/Her Environment

In line with SPUD's advocacy for the environment, I'd like to share some insights on environment and man's relation to it.  My reflection will be more philosophical and will be centered on the nature of human person and his/her relation to environment.  In writing this article, my approach is somehow historical --in the sense that I am going to treat the different views of the nature of man in the history of philosophy to further my analysis of man's relation with the environment.  It is undeniably true that "the way we look at ourselves affects the way we relate with others, like our environment."

HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

Let me start with ancient Greeks and their view on human person.  The ancient Greeks viewed man as part of the whole order of the cosmos.  Cosmos is governed by principles.  As part of the cosmos, man is also governed by a principle, which is reason.  For the Greeks, cosmos has an existing order, or it is already arranged.  Thus, man needs not to disrupt the order of the cosmos.  Rather, as rational being, it is his duty and task to understand the principles governing cosmos.  Technically, he doesn't "actively understand" what is written as principles in the book of nature, but simply "passively understand" those principles.  In other words, man as a knower is merely a passive recipient of what he extracts as principles written in nature.  What is ideal of him is contemplation -contemplating what is written as principles in the book of nature.

In this state of affairs between man and nature, we can infer that, for the Greeks, man is not going to "engage with nature."  By "engaging with nature," I mean, man doesn't have to alter what is written in the book of nature but simply "conforms" what nature demands of him to understand.  Thus, man is a "spectator" of the ongoing of nature -watching the influx of nature.  While watching the influx of nature, he extracts its constant pattern or its law.  (I hesitate to use the term, "constant pattern" since for the Greeks, it's a law [logos, in Greek term] that governs nature.)  Hence, it is man's duty to nature to "intellectually deal" with it, since in the first place he is rational or has the intellectual capacity to deal with it.

This Greek’s attitude towards the environment is still apparent to people living in the Medieval ages.  Though their fundamental perspective on life and environment has changed yet their attitude towards the environment is still the same, which is of stewardship to environment, not of domination over it.  Stewardship to the environment is entirely a new idea among Medieval people, which is not exactly the same with Greek’s idea of “spectatorship.”  Stewardship connotes the idea of lord-tenant relationship, which was the social structure existing during the medieval Europe.  A feudal lord owned a huge area of land and tenants tilled the land and paid tributes to the lord.  This social system was veiled with animosity yet the rule of the day was clear: “the lord claims ownership of the land, and tenants should be stewards of it.”  On the other hand, the idea of “spectatorship” of the Greeks connotes an independent activity –a mental activity, which is only appropriate for those we consider as philosophers.  The place of the philosophers in the Greek society was a privilege one.  It was one of those people detached from the world of ordinariness, or say, it was a place of those who do not do manual work.

This social system is somehow the outcome of the dominant religious belief in those times –that of Christianity.  In Christian beliefs as propounded by Christian thinkers and theologians, the cosmos –once viewed by the ancient Greeks as simply natural or part of the natural phenomenon, is now viewed as something created by God –eternal, all-powerful, all-knowing God.  As part of creation, human beings are entrusted by God to rule and govern all things –both living and non-living, He created since the beginning of time.  Because of this, human beings become the pinnacle of God’s creation. 

This God-man relationship is really like that of the lord-tenant relationship.  God, the creator, entrusts his creation to his people, and the people, the tenants, work and take care of the creation entrusted to them by God.  As tenants, they pay tributes to God through prayers and corporal works of mercy to the less fortunate.  This social set-up engenders in God’s people the attitude of stewardship –taking care of what is entrusted of them.  The idea of stewardship, then, cannot be divorced from the idea of lordship and trusted workers of the Lord of all.

This perspective of human beings as stewards does not allow Medieval people to become lords and masters of nature (or cosmos or environment).  They don’t have the sense of dominion or controlling environment.  Instead, they should take care of the environment and enjoy its produce.