Phenomenological Methods

Phenomenology, in its literal sense, is a study of phenomenon.  Phenomenon refers to "that which appears," in contrast to noumenon, which refers to "that which does not appear."  Phenomenalists like Husserl believe that what we can directly know is "that which appears" to us.  It's hard to know something "which does not appear to us."  For example, if you are looking at a house what you can directly know is the facade of the house --that is, of course, if you are standing in front of the house.  In your current position, you will not know the parts of the house, which are hidden like what is inside the house or what is at the back of it.  Unlike Kant who claims that we can't know the noumenon, Husserl claims the opposite --we can know the noumenon (or the eidos of the experience).  To do so, we need to follow the steps in phenomenological reflection.  For more discussion, click for this article, Husserl's Phenomenological Methods (Jumawan, 2017).

Gabriel Marcel, a French philosopher, also devices two levels of reflection: primary and secondary reflection.  In his article, Primary and Secondary Reflection: An Existential Fulcrum, Marcel (cited in Dy, 2001) simply defines primary reflection as one which "dissolves the unity of experience," whereas secondary reflection as one which "recuperates the unity of experience."  There is not much elaboration of their meaning but Marcel illustrates the application of each level of reflection by giving a few examples.  This will be treated at some length in the next chapter.